

20-A236 875
11 11 11 11 11 11

2

STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

WARS AND RUMORS OF WARS: LIKELY CONFLICTS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARY D. SPEER
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1991

DTIC
SELECTED
JUN 11 1991
S 8 D



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

91-01774
11 11 11 11 11 11

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013			7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) AWCAC	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) WARS AND RUMORS OF WARS: LIKELY CONFLICTS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Gary D Speer					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Individual	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1991, April, 2		15. PAGE COUNT 86	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)					
<p>The year 1989 ushered in major changes marking the end of the Cold War. The world as we had come to know it centered on the East-West Cold War vested in the balance of power of two superpowers. The end of the Cold War brought liberalization to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union. In the future, the world will become more inter-dependent with economic issues paramount. However, this rapprochement has not eliminated conflicts. The result is an even less stable world without the constant threat of any war escalating to superpower conflict. This study is a global appraisal for the next five to fifteen years. It identifies potential conflicts in each region based on historical confrontations and current trends. The study further identifies those conflicts in which the United States is most likely to become involved.</p>					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL LAWRENCE B. GOODWIN, JR., COL, IN			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3733		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAC

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

WARS AND RUMORS OF WARS:
LIKELY CONFLICTS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Gary D. Speer, IN

Colonel Lawrence B. Goodwin
Project Advisor

U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Gary D. Speer, LTC, USA

TITLE: Wars and Rumors of Wars: Likely Conflicts for the
United States in the early 21st Century

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 2 April 1991 PAGES: 86 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The year 1989 ushered in major changes marking the end of the Cold War. The world as we had come to know it centered on the East-West Cold War vested in the balance of power of two superpowers. The end of the Cold War brought liberalization to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union. In the future, the world will become more interdependent with economic issues paramount. However, this rapprochement has not eliminated conflicts. The result is an even less stable world without the constant threat of any war escalating to superpower conflict. This study is a global appraisal for the next five to fifteen years. It identifies potential conflicts in each region based on historical confrontations and current trends. The study further identifies those conflicts in which the United States is most likely to become involved.



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down. The world finally realized the much feared communist domino theory; only the dominos falling, one by one, were the Eastern European communist regimes. Peace was breaking out all over with perestroika, glasnost, the wall, and Eastern Europe's emerging from its communist hold. Finally, the Cold War abruptly ended, creating an optimistic outlook for world peace. Then, the United States invaded Panama on December 20th to dethrone strongman Manuel Noriega and install the popularly elected government. This quickly reminded the world that peace was fragile. Regional and internal conflicts still raged in every corner of the world. The Middle East remained a perennial tinderbox. Still, there was hope of reducing the armed forces and cashing in on the peace dividend because the main threat to world peace had apparently vanished. Then, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia and control of the world's oil supply. This unprovoked attack prompted the deployment of United States combat power to Saudi Arabia, a United Nations embargo of Iraq, and the formation of a multinational coalition to counter the aggressor. After five months, sanctions failed to persuade Iraq to leave Kuwait, and the UN recognized hostilities commenced January 17, 1991. Could this be the template for future conflict for the United States?

The purpose of this paper is to identify potential world conflicts in the early 21st century. Although no guaranteed crystal ball, this paper affords a global appraisal for the next

five to fifteen years and projects likely future conflicts based on interests, trends, and past conflicts. Further, this projection will lead to the analysis of which of those potential future conflicts could involve the United States and the circumstances leading to that involvement.

THE WORLD AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

The world in the year 2000 will be very different from what we have known for the last half of the 20th century. The Cold War's East-West confrontation defined our entire frame of reference in the international community. For almost every international question, the United States' position was simply opposite that of the Soviet Union, and vice versa. While avoiding the ultimate devastation of nuclear war, global war, or even armed confrontation involving the two superpowers, the world has not known peace since the Second World War. Armed conflicts touched every region of the world. Most involved the United States in some manner. East-West politics made strange bedfellows; the United States often found itself, and still does, supporting less than ideal governments whose only redeeming attribute was anti-communism.

The intense competition of the Cold War's threat of superpower nuclear confrontation does seem to have passed. The two superpowers will no longer dominate the world in 2000; bipolarity will succumb to multipolarity, which will include Japan, Europe, and possibly China as global powers. The 21st

century will be one interdependent world with global communications, transportation, travel, and, most importantly, trade.

Yet, this diffusion of power and resulting multipolarity could increase competition worldwide. There will be more emphasis placed on regional blocs, such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) or the Organization of American States (OAS). There will be more active players globally, making it even more difficult to gain resolution to an international question. As another consideration, a regional power, such as China, India, Iran, Nigeria, and Brazil, will emerge in each region.

Nearly all armed conflicts in the last 45 years have been in the Third World, including every war involving the United States. The world did not experience even one year of peace during that period. There has always been, and probably always will be turmoil in the Third World. There were at least 33 active armed wars around the globe in 1987. Superpower reconciliation left the Third World's apparently innate problems untouched. Ethnic disputes, continued tribal conflicts, secessionist movements, resurgent nationalism, drugs, and economic depression will continue to fuel unrest. As long as there is poverty, hunger, disasters, inequity, strife from human rights issues, and internal discontent, political conditions will be ripe for violence and insurgencies. Ethnic groups' desire to unite under common rule in their own homeland is as strong as ever, and some

states including the Soviet Union face the threat of disintegration. Therefore, internal conflicts are more likely.

The bipolar structure provided the benefit of a framework for stability. No doubt, many conflicts did not escalate to war due to the controlling interests of the two military superpowers to avoid any situation that could possibly lead to direct confrontation. Historically, border or territory disputes have been primary causes for wars. Although states today more readily accept the territorial status quo of world boundaries, border disputes exist in every region. Concomitant with superpower reconciliation will be their tendency to distance themselves or avoid regional disputes. Oddly enough, this may result in greater instability in that some states may now feel freer to initiate war than before when the superpowers were looking over their shoulder. Regional powers will move quickly to fill the vacuum created by superpower retrenchment. Nonetheless, the world's chronic adversaries never needed superpower encouragement to sustain their ongoing conflict, Iran-Iraq, India-Pakistan, Somalia-Ethiopia, or Arab-Israeli, to name a few. The sources of such conflicts have not gone away, and there are no signs that these countries have the political motivation to work to ease tensions. With over 200 governments and a significant number of non-governmental criminal and paramilitary forces able to decide whether to use force or not, it is credulous to expect all decisions to be moderate, rational, and peaceful. Wars will

continue to occur between states and within them, and wars tend to involve the interests of other external nations.

On the bright side, greater international cooperation and the political trends toward democracy are definitely positive indicators. Notably, no two democracies have gone to war against one another since World War II. Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union have moved toward more democratic processes. With Haiti's December 1990 election, every country in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba and Surinam currently has a democratically elected government. However, these new democratic governments will be fragile for years to come. Anywhere in the Third World, there is always the possibility of a return to an undemocratic form of government. The rise of a new fanatical or aggressive leader, such as Fidel Castro, Idi Amin, Muammar Qadhafi, Ayatollah Khomeini, or Saddam Hussein, defies rational norms and provokes other states to conflict. They espouse high ideals and rationalize violence in promising simplistic solutions to desperate people. The post-cold war environment could see "a new round of dictatorships and dirty wars" in the Third World.² The Cold War may have expired, but the new more unpredictable threat for the United States and throughout the world is one of instability.

Global economic interdependence is an international market economy that transcends government-to-government relationships with multinational corporations operating around the globe. Telecommunications provide the means for participation in other

nations' stock markets. In the year 2000, economic power will be concentrated in three or four world powers: the European Community, Japan, the United States, and possibly China. The world's GNP at the 21st century is likely to be concentrated with one quarter each in the Pacific Rim, the United States, and Europe, with the rest of world sharing the remaining fourth. The mature and maturing economies' growth may slow down in the next decade.³ While the rate of growth may be slower, they will continue to grow and enjoy their economic advantages compared to the world in general. As states become increasingly dependent on foreign sources of raw materials and energy, access to foreign markets and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) will be pivotal to national interests. With the world economy overshadowed by dependence on oil, its potential disruption can create conflict, as evidenced by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Economic interests and the competition for raw materials and natural resources will dominate world affairs. Other related issues, such as illegal drugs, the environment, and terrorism, will grow in importance.

A North-South orientation will replace the East-West chasm that predestined foreign policy since World War II. The division of haves and have-nots will be even more pronounced. The North-South gap will overshadow international economics, reflecting the economic disparity between the North or industrially mature world and the South or underdeveloped world of increasing poverty. The heightened expectations created by telecommunications will result

in the South exerting increased pressure for the North to share its wealth. Meanwhile, the expanding importance of Asia and the Pacific Rim confirms the possibility for poor countries to develop. Already, we can see the rise of Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs): India, Brazil, and the East Asian countries of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Potential NICs on the horizon may include Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Nigeria, and South Africa.

The rest of the world, including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, remains economically backward. These share the tremendous problem of world debt that squelches economic growth. Development stalled in Egypt, the Philippines, Latin America, Africa, and the former Iron Curtain countries from debt and domestic unrest. Then, some in the South will digress even further in debt to the point of hopelessness. Countries such as Ethiopia, Malawi, Bhutan, and Bangladesh may shape a Fourth World constituting an international counterpart to the "homeless," too economically oppressed to challenge the inequities of the current system. So, their economic condition remains unlikely to improve.⁴

Demographics will become an increasingly important component in economic development. The Third World will experience rapid population growth or over-population. Already, Asia and the Pacific Rim with over half the world's population will grow to two-thirds in the 21st century. In a multipolar world, China and India will become demographic powers influential by the sheer

size of their populations. Countries that are already experiencing political instability seem to have the highest population growth generating increased migration and urbanization with accompanying problems in housing, sanitation, pollution, disease, and unemployment. As populations grow, increased migration to urban areas in much of the world worsens existing infrastructure problems and poor standards of living. By 2010, Latin America will be 75% urban, and the Middle East, 73%.⁵ The rich countries are getting older while the poorer countries will be made up of the younger who are largely either unemployed or underemployed.

Besides the obvious economic burdens of the Third World, the proliferation of tanks, missiles, and quality, high technological armaments created a heavily armed world. Iraq, for example, presented an army of a million men when it invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Over twelve countries have more than 3,000 tanks; at least 28 countries have over 1,000. But, only a very few countries can project their power outside the region in which located. A proliferation in arms production accompanied the proliferation of weapons. India, Brazil, North Korea, Egypt, and China are now among the world's leading arms dealers. To some extent, the US, USSR, France, Britain, and Brazil may influence other states by either making weapons available or withholding them. In the future, there will undeniably be less leverage over arms transfers and probably less potential for regional arms control agreements. Further, there has been a proliferation of

intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and chemical weapons. At least twenty Third World countries have IRBMs and many also have the capability to produce them. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, China, Taiwan, the Koreas, and Israel, all have chemical weapons capability.⁶ The combination of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles could destabilize regions and escalate conflicts affecting surrounding states as illustrated by Iraq's SCUD attacks on Israel. Science and technology fuel the Third World's demand for new and even more destructive weapons.

The greatest concern in the world's arms saturation is nuclear proliferation and avoiding nuclear war. The United States and the Soviet Union will sustain their strategic parity and remain the world's only global nuclear powers. Efforts to halt nuclear proliferation in the Third World by regional declaration and treaties earmarking them as nuclear free zones have not succeeded. Although not acknowledging that they have nuclear capability, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel, probably do. In addition to these four states, Brazil and Argentina have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and could develop a nuclear capability. Also, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria will likely join the nuclear club by 2000.⁷ Although after Desert Storm, Iraq may think twice before renewing any nuclear ambition. As noted above, twenty or more countries already have the technical capability to deliver nuclear weapons with SCUDs or FROGs. Further, international conflicts could escalate to a limited nuclear exchange. Once the genie is out of

the bottle, any nuclear use in regional war could open the door to further use and greater proliferation.

Regional conflicts arise from long, festering problems that explode very quickly. There are many issues that could exasperate the ills of the global society and upset the trends toward economic progress and democracy. Rather than face the potential social upheaval of an Iranian-style fundamentalist revolution, some leaders may choose to divert public attention by an external war. Terrorism and paramilitary criminals pose new security threats across national boundaries. Science and technology will dominate the pace for future change. A monumental scientific discovery such as North Korea's development of nuclear weapons or Iraq's employment of fuel air explosives (FAE) could only add to the world's uncertainty and volatility. Events external to a region regularly affect regional security as well as those internal to states of the region. The world is truly a dangerous place.

THE UNITED STATES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

While many, such as Yale Professor Paul Kennedy, indict the United States with future decline as a global power, any change is only relative to other states' increase in international influence, economic growth, and their share of the world GNP. Several other nations will grow in their impact on the world in terms of economic and resulting political influence. US power and influence in the 21st century may be less, but no nation will

have greater. The United States is now and will remain the only true superpower as we enter the 21st century, the only country who is both economically and militarily strong, and the only country capable of power projection around the globe.⁸

US broad national objectives and interests will not change significantly into the 21st century. Survival of the United States will remain at the apex of national objectives. Survival interests are based on deterring aggression and protecting the United States and its citizens. This usually includes protecting US citizens and property abroad. In his 1990 report on national security strategy, the President also identified terrorism, arms proliferation, and illegal drugs as threats to national survival. Narcotrafficking and illicit drugs threaten US national security by subverting productive Americans at home and posing a "clear and present danger" to the survival of young democracies. Other national objectives will continue to focus on maintaining a healthy economy, promoting a stable and secure world, sustaining healthy alliances, and encouraging the growth of human rights, democratic institutions, and free markets.⁹ A healthy and growing economy is dependent on the continued access to markets, energy, and raw materials. This requires freedom of maritime navigation and transit, specifically, freedom to use the critical SLOCs that connect the US with those markets, energy sources, and raw materials. Promoting democratic trends with parallel enhancement of human rights guarantees, supporting economic development, and maintaining regional military balances are

essential to a stable and secure world. So, it will remain a US interest to aid in combatting any threats to these trends to include external aggression, insurgencies, terrorism, and drug trafficking, especially during the critical period when young democracies are so fragile.

The Cold War confrontation led to alliances structured and based upon the East-West threat. Now, the United States can take a fresh look at the world into the 21st century without the East-West blinders. There will not be an automatic answer to any question, the position opposite that of the USSR. Recognizing the world's growing interdependence, the US will continue to seek a more balanced relationship with other nations for a cooperative environment that supports the democratic and economic trends. Alliances will be mostly bilateral seeking other nations' increased shared involvement in underwriting the commitment to democracy. These alliances will inherently include access to ports and airfields as the US reduces forward deployed forces.

By the very nature of the world's becoming more interdependent and, in essence, operating in a world economy, the United States will continue to have global interests. To illustrate the magnitude of interdependence, Robert S. McNamara, former President of the World Bank, says that future American ". . . economic welfare depends on the welfare of Brazil, Mexico, India, and China" ¹⁰ There is much domestic concern over the selling of America by Japan's purchase of significant US holdings. Yet, the United States holds the greatest amount of

foreign owned assets in the world. The astounding trade imbalance is likely to continue in terms of production imports exceeding exports. This common, but somewhat misleading, measure does not credit the United States with its vast exportation of services, not to mention the profits and production of US-owned multinational corporations operating branches overseas. In many respects, American needs for access to the world's markets are more concerned with the ability for its corporations to operate in those markets, than simply exporting goods for sale there. There will remain shortfalls in raw materials with the need to acquire them elsewhere. Of particular concern are the strategic minerals available from only a few sources. The Persian Gulf War renewed concern over the apparent dependence on Mid-East oil. As a consequence, there will certainly be a move toward alternative fuels and reduction of domestic oil consumption, but oil will remain a critical import for the US well into the 21st century.

Population growth in the United States will reflect the increased immigration from Latin America and Asia. These new Americans will progressively make their political views represented. The inherent link to Europe of American heritage from the 19th and 20th centuries will be displaced by new stronger traces to Latin America and Asia. Besides the popular sympathies that would rise from Blacks over war in South Africa or American Jews and Arabs over war in the Middle East, there will be equally strong and unprecedented popular sympathies over conflicts in Latin America and Asia.

The United States will remain a military superpower. Arms control implementation will curb the strategic arsenal, but the risk from the mere presence of nuclear weapons will not go away. Based on current plans and budget projections, the American force structure will be smaller by the turn of the century. Forward deployed forces will be only a fraction of the current strength. Nevertheless, the United States will retain the power projection capability so aptly exhibited in the deployment to Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm. Additionally, United States security assistance should grow in importance of executing foreign policy aimed at global stability. The entire security assistance program requires adjustment to benefit more friends than 85% of the program committed to only five countries (Israel, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, and Pakistan). The US has such enormous interests at stake, that arming its friends is necessary to help them defend themselves and to assist American military capability should it ever have to intervene to protect them or secure critical resources, such as Gulf oil.¹¹ During the Cold War, issues caveated as matters of national security took priority over domestic influences, that distinction is no longer so clear, especially considering the overwhelming budget deficit. There will continue to be global economic assistance responsibilities competing with the efforts to control domestic economic problems by reducing deficit spending in federal budgets.

Americans will debate the question on whether and to what degree the United States should act as the world's policeman.

The Vietnam experience left a permanent imprint on the American public to detest any potential conflict that remotely resembles risking the lives of American soldiers in a foreign war of no perceived threat to the United States. The somewhat small loss of life and the short duration of Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait made these conflicts acceptable to the point of gaining public favor. While the American public endorsed the deployment of American troops to Saudi Arabia after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the support began to erode as time wore on to the commencement of hostilities. Television provided every household with a firsthand look at the cost of military intervention and war. Although the loss of US lives in Desert Storm was extremely small for the magnitude of combat power arrayed on the battlefield, the American people may still be reluctant to support another major military option in the near term. American temperament will not sustain long wars in the Third World, so forces should not be committed to combat except swift, decisive, and discriminate actions. Desert Storm may not be the pattern for the future; the circumstances were unique. The distinction between good and evil usually is not so clear.¹²

Hence, any use of military force in the next five to fifteen years must be in response to a clear threat to United States' national interests. American idealistic values will continue to shape those issues that will be designated as vital, such as injustice, deprivation of human rights, external interruptions to democratic progress, terrorism, and illicit drugs. The risk to

national security may be deemed high, even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Internationally, the United States will not retreat from its seven existing treaty obligations: NATO, South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Manila Pact (Thailand and the Philippines), ANZUS, and the Rio Pact protecting Latin America from outside aggression. Yet, the US will be selective in honoring an ally's request for the commitment of American combat troops.

Instability and any Third World conflict potentially threaten US interests. For example, threats to the new struggling democracies such as El Salvador, decreased access for the US around the globe, jeopardized basing in the Philippines, or any potential interdiction of the SLOCs to the Persian Gulf or Asia, all threaten US interests. To complicate matters further, the ability to influence events in other regions will diminish. The United States will no longer have permanent friends or enemies in the Third World. Prevention of future hegemony in any region is a major US concern since the presence of a regional hegemon could threaten American interests.¹³ While a direct attack on the United States or a true threat to national survival is extremely unlikely, US interests worldwide are always potential targets for terrorists or as the focal point for the hatred generated by some radical, charismatic leader. The United States will most assuredly not deploy American soldiers to any country, even a democratically elected government, in response to an internal

threat, with the possible exception of Latin America or the Caribbean due solely to proximity.

Given the tremendous scope of involvements abroad, both ethnic and financial, US isolationism is extremely unlikely. But, the United States must be more reserved in designating interests as vital.¹⁴ The degree of involvement depends on the perceived closeness of the issue to US interests, geography, and history. With more challenges to its influence, the risk of US setbacks will increase. An overwhelming concern to avoid military defeat or risk many casualties in an environment of large, well-armed militaries will question any proposed military involvement. Sometimes, however, to remain uninvolved could setback international perception and prestige.

The United States may respond in many different ways. Obviously, the first choice for involvement in any situation would be a course of action that promotes peace and prevents war. Nation building, civic action, humanitarian and disaster relief operations combine the military with political and economic actions. If fully integrated with economic assistance and other programs, these activities can help host governments in attacking the root problems for internal unrest. Security assistance provides a means for training and equipping indigenous forces so that they can handle their own conflicts. Additionally, training exercises in conjunction with security assistance efforts can promote professionalism among other militaries while confirming US resolve. Peacekeeping operations serve to preserve the peace

in conflicts with negotiated cease fires or resolutions. A show of force, port calls, and forward deployments, particularly with naval forces, further demonstrates resolve as a deterrent short of armed conflict. Even during periods of apparent peace, there is always the possibility of an armed response to a crisis situation such as combatting terrorism, counternarcotics, non-combatant evacuations or rescue operations. Military assistance also may be required in an advisory capacity in counterinsurgency operations. The commitment of United States combat troops will be limited to only those situations that can be presented as definite threats to vital United States' national interests. Of course, presidents will continuously redefine interests as vital based on the evolving world situation.

The US will have continuing interests in Europe although its power and influence there will diminish. There will need to be a check and balance on the unified Germany while fostering East European pluralism and movement to free market economies. The vast Soviet military capability still exists; consequently, a potential threat still exists. America has a major role to play in the Pacific as the only country with both economic and military power in the region. Asian nations welcome US presence considering the alternative of Japanese rearmament. Also, there is no way the US could ignore a significant change in the regional balance of power in Asia and the resulting impact on US interests. The United States has important intrinsic interests in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia, including

support for Israel and moderate Arab states and ensuring access to oil. Africa is a prime source for strategic minerals. Latin America will remain key from its geographic closeness and how easily its problems spill over into North America.¹⁵ Almost nothing happens anywhere in the world that has absolutely no impact on the US, its citizens, or its economic interests. The United States will not, should not, and cannot shrink from its obligations inherent in its world prominence.

EUROPE AND NATO

Europe, the only global power that is not a sovereign state, has collective economic power without the military power of the United States. Economic unification and integration in 1992 will further consolidate this power in Europe. This economic community is undeniably greater than the sum of its parts. The Cold War also dominated European thinking. The first direct benefit of Cold War termination is that the probability of general war in Europe or against the Soviet Union is almost nil. Europe is now eager to redirect its resources away from defense.

With NATO, western Europe is politically and economically mature, truly interdependent both economically and militarily, and comfortable with its frontiers. The United States will continue as an active security partner in Europe as the leading member of NATO. In all probability, all American troops will be withdrawn from Europe except some contingent to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. European nations, in general,

share the desire for a stable and secure global environment as a means to protect their continued economic growth. They must be equally concerned with the protection of SLOCs and their access to markets, raw materials, and oil. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is the new means for negotiated stability and security. The major contention on the horizon will be Europe's response to the United States petition for more sharing in the responsibilities to protect mutual interests and to foster young democracies and market economies. Secretary of State Baker is among those calling for a greater role for NATO in regional conflicts.¹⁶ With the US having provided the protection for global interests in the past, there has been a general reluctance to look beyond the continent in terms of committing resources. Desert Storm provided the opportunity to demonstrate that shared responsibility. Great Britain, France, Italy, and Canada were on the front lines with other NATO members contributing in a supporting role.

Unified Germany poses an interesting dilemma for both East and West Europe with vivid memories of two world wars. Europeans are naturally afraid of the revival of German militarism. Helmut Kohl has tried to reassure the world that there is nothing to fear. For the near term, Germany will be preoccupied with the internal problems from its ingestion of East Germany, consolidating 45 years of divergent philosophies and economies. Once the situation at home is progressing, Germany should take a leadership role in the reconstruction of Eastern Europe.

Besides Germany, there are some minor dormant territorial issues within NATO. The German speaking Italians in the Southern Tyrol prefer unity with the Austrian Tyrol. The Basque claim an industrially key part of Spain near France as their desired independent homeland. The perennial conflict in Northern Ireland still shows no willingness by the participants to end the struggle through some negotiated settlement. Whatever the case, the United Kingdom will try to continue their progress toward improving human rights issues for all in hopes of creating an environment conducive to peaceful resolution. Moreover, Ireland is not going to intervene militarily on behalf of the militant Irish Republican Army. The Quebec separatist issue in Canada is more prone to some kind of peaceful settlement or condominium. A United Nations Peacekeeping Force has been on Cyprus since 1964. The Aegean question is the only conflict risking war between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, involving Cyprus and the islands in the Aegean claimed by Greece. Each nation is interested in Cyprus, specifically in the treatment of their nationalities by the other on the island. Currently, both are abiding by a negotiated settlement on the islands, but Greek presence so close to their shores is a constant thorn for Turkey.

Although the general outlook for the 21st century is very favorable, Turkey poses the most potential volatility within NATO. Democratic reform and economic growth are progressing. Internally, Turkey must deal with two significant separatist groups, the Armenians and the Kurds. Armenian desires for a

separate state have been unabated for years. Any uprising from the ethnic nationalism recently expressed in Soviet Armenia could possibly spill over into Turkey. A serious challenge to Turkish authority is remote since the preponderance of the Turkish Armenian population resides and prospers in major cities, such as Istanbul. The Kurds claim that they were artificially divided into four regions by exploiting states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria). The Kurdish peoples readily move across borders based on the political climate. For example, in 1980, Turkish Kurds fled to Iraq; then, 60,000 fled Iraq to Turkey in 1988 after Saddam Hussein's chemical attack.¹⁷ This conflict has frequently turned violent over the years. The Persian Gulf War in Iraq intensified Kurdish nationalism and hopes for a homeland. Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq or possibly even Syria could lead to Turkish reaction to prohibit Kurd secession in Turkey.

Turkey controls access to the Mediterranean Sea from the Black Sea at the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. These strategic chokepoints are of greater interest to the Soviet Union than the United States, since it allows their only warm water access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The Soviet Union remains the only potential threat to the integrity of the Turkish Dardanelles, but since glasnost and perestroika, the likelihood has diminished. In the unlikely event that Turkey is threatened by Soviet aggression as a spillover from its internal conflict in Georgia or Armenia, it would be a matter for the entire NATO

alliance. However, the Soviet leadership will avoid any such confrontation.

Experiencing a rising tide of nationalism, Eastern European nations achieved new freedom in 1990 after years of lacking self-determination. The Warsaw Pact no longer exists, and the democratic process is underway throughout Eastern Europe. Eager to become part of the developed world, Hungary has already asked to join both NATO and the European Community, but the requests seem premature. Years of centrally controlled economies left Eastern Europe with weak infrastructures and internal disarray. To compound the situation, there are only two ethnically homogeneous states in Eastern Europe: Poland (95%) and Hungary (90%). Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are the most diverse and already face secessionist movements. A multi-cultural society, Yugoslavia is already on the verge of civil war with both Croatia and Slovenia declaring themselves as autonomous republics. Bulgaria and Romania are struggling in the transition process. Albania, the poorest country in Eastern Europe, seems the laggard in reform. The conversion from totalitarian to democratic systems is accompanied by tremendous anxiety and difficulties.¹⁸

Without Soviet control, there is a high probability for the reemergence of traditional disputes and border conflicts throughout Eastern Europe. Concomitantly, local problems will have increased consequence. Poland's concern over German unification is probably the most pronounced in Europe since part of Poland was pre-World War II Germany and because the German

occupation during the war was particularly harsh. Likewise, the Soviet Union retained the part of pre-war Poland it occupied in 1939. Should the USSR break up, the people in the territory in question would most likely choose to return to Polish control. Additionally, any of the following irritations could escalate: Poland's border claims with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania's potential conflict over Transylvania, Romania's interest in Soviet Moldavia and Bessarabia, and Bulgaria's claims on part of the Dobruja area of Romania along the Black Sea area. Yugoslavia is at odds with Albania over Kosovo and with Bulgaria over Macedonia.¹⁹ However, it is not likely, that any of these border disputes will result in armed conflict in the near term with their preoccupation with democratic liberalization and economic growth. The US should take an active role in developing healthy relationships with each nation. Any necessary outside military assistance should come from their European neighbors as implementation of shared security with the by-product of promoting military professionalism. Both the United States and Western Europe's involvement must be one of encouraging the democratic process and the movement toward market economies.

THE SOVIET UNION

No where has change been so rapid and so unexpected as in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics itself. Political glasnost and economic perestroika may have originally aimed at refining communist ideology, but it has been a death knell. The Soviet

Union's leadership finally realized that its control economy was not working. Lacking the economic dimension to remain a post-Cold War superpower, the Soviet Union will still be the largest single military threat. They continue to devote a substantial share of the budget to defense with modernization programs and emphasis on their strategic nuclear force. Yet, the USSR must bring military spending under control to assist in progress toward financial solvency. Besides its military, the Soviet Union is an underdeveloped country. Current economic initiatives are lagging, and the institutional infrastructure has decayed to the point that there is a loss of national pride. A further decline in the Soviet share of international economy is certain. Even with the termination of the Cold War, the US and the USSR will continue to avoid potential confrontations that could conceivably pit the two military superpowers against each other. Undeniably, the USSR remains the only military threat to Europe, but the probability of Soviet aggression is implausible. The Soviet's main threats are secessionist movements or civil war. The United States will copiously monitor any dismemberment of the Soviet Union to keep tabs on the distribution of their nuclear warheads.

To show that they have not totally lost superpower status because they yielded on Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is determined to maintain an international presence by continuing to preserve some Third World allies.²⁰ These clients include Afghanistan, North Korea, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. However, the

Soviets are likely to stop funding Cuba and Afghanistan. Their continued association with these repressive governments hurts their new international image and poses an economic drain that Moscow can no longer tolerate. The Soviets also aspire to be regarded as an Asian power with a goal of increased economic relations in the region. They may even return the Kuril Islands to Japan as a gesture of good faith toward this objective. The experience in Afghanistan will discourage their involvement in Muslim countries, for the Soviets have enough Muslim problems at home. Since a genuine rapprochement with China is unlikely, if there is to be a next major war involving the Soviet Union, China would be the most probable adversary based on the long, shared borders and the Chinese demographics. This could be the acceptable expedition needed to stimulate the Soviet economy.²¹ The path to a more democratic market orientation from the ideological paragon of communism will be very bumpy. Liberalization will not be achieved without some detours.

Following their ordeal in Afghanistan, the Soviet people are not supportive of any foreign expeditions. The key issues for the USSR in the future are internal: will the union survive, and will there be a regression to authoritarian controls? The Soviet Union has been "an unnatural state . . . held together by force"; how can it continue once an element of free will is introduced?²² Economic stagnation, Russian nativism, non-Russian nationalism, and the desire for political participation create the Soviet unrest and political instability, already

evident in the Baltic states, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. In Soviet Central Asia, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism poses another twist. Terrorism and insurgencies will increase in the Soviet Union. Republics could fight each other, more so than the central Soviet, as in the Armenian-Azerbaijani civil war. To date, fourteen of the fifteen republics have declared some type of autonomy from the central government. The Soviet Army was dispatched to Latvia and Lithuania in early 1991 to forcibly prove there was still a central government, and martial law may be next. The international community sees this is an indication that Soviet liberalization has run its course. If Mikhail Gorbachev should fall from power as result of the turmoil from demands for greater independence, the Soviet leadership that follows could return to more authoritarian control. On the other hand, depending on when such a fall might occur, the new leadership might actually be more liberal having been frustrated because the Gorbachev reforms had not moved far and quickly enough.

It is easy to foresee an obituary stating that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cease to exist. The result is likely to be neither Soviet, socialist, nor a union. The resulting new central government could be a transformation into a true confederation. Any breakup of the Soviet empire will create instability around its huge border. USSR change affects American national security issues, but the United States has little ability to influence its outcome. Stability in the USSR will

remain the most important concern. Furthermore, the Soviet Union could become an alternative source for US strategic mineral requirements. No matter how sympathetic Americans may be to the plight of peoples within the republics, such as the Baltics, the US will not interfere with Soviet internal problems. Further, even if the USSR disintegrates, its military hardware, including over 33,000 nuclear warheads, will remain, and will likely be placed in less stable hands. It just may be in the US interest to see the USSR survive as a union.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC RIM

The vast Asia/ Pacific region will grow in economic and strategic importance to United States in the 21st century. Primary US regional objectives include: maintaining free access through the Indian Ocean and South China Seas SLOCs; maintaining the capability to meet treaty requirements with South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, and Australia; preventing states such as Vietnam, North Korea, or even the USSR from interfering in others' affairs; supporting stability and independence; and building durable strategic relations with China. Political change, although not all positive, has been constant through the 1980s and is likely to continue at a rapid pace. North Korea, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam are not necessarily immune to democratic change. Yet, in North Korea there has been no movement to political openness. There was some progress in China, Vietnam, and Burma, but a retreat to authoritarian control

quickly followed. A recent military coup overthrew the elected government in Thailand. Even isolated Mongolia has now held some elections, and Bangladesh just held its first free parliamentary election in twenty years. With some progress even under authoritarian governments, South Korea and Taiwan moved toward greater parliamentarianism. The old Asian democracies such as India, Malaysia, and Singapore, remain intact, but not without the internal strife that plagues the Third World. The region is also another front in the American war on drugs against paramilitary criminals who operate primarily from India, Burma, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines.²³

The most significant change in the region has been phenomenal economic growth led by Japan. Australia is also an established industrial state. China and New Zealand have that same potential capability. Thailand, the fastest growing economy in the world; Indonesia, among the top ten producers; and Malaysia, now the top micro-chip maker, are on the verge of joining the Four Tigers (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) as NICs. Each success benefits other states within the region. Thirty-six percent of all US trade is with Asia and the Pacific, and surpassed Europe (20%), Canada (20%), and Latin America (12%).²⁴

Japan's global economic prominence is unquestioned. But, Japan is likely to remain a "one dimension" power. It has a homogeneous population, but otherwise is resource poor. Its global involvement will increase, motivated to protect self-interests, primarily to ensure access to needed resources.

Japan's strategic leverage is in its wealth. As the world's leading net creditor nation with an extremely high rate of personal savings, Japan will continue to invest in new overseas ventures. This investment assists developing countries tremendously. In fact, Japan already provides most of the economic assistance to Asia.²⁵

The greatest regional concern is that Japan might expand its foreign policy to include a military element of power. Likely to remain a security partner through the Treaty for Mutual Cooperation, Japan could rearm with US encouragement to share more of the burden for collective defense. Partially from the terms of the Second World War, the Japanese population has grown up a pacifist society. Their constitution denounces war. Consequently, one market prohibited by Japanese law is arms exports. Nevertheless, Japan commits approximately one percent of its GNP to defense, making its defense budget the third largest in the world, but that does not buy very much in the Japanese economy. Japanese military expenditures will rise with a growing GNP, but it will not necessarily mean usable military influence throughout the region. Still, the Japanese Self-Defense Force represents an important military power. Its rise places it second in the world in technological capability that could easily develop an ability for some force projection.²⁶ Feeling somewhat secure, Japan dismisses a Soviet invasion as a real threat, but some kind of clash with China is inevitably. The Self-Defense Forces defend SLOCs out to 1,000 miles from the

port of Tokyo, including four strategically key straits: Le Perouse, Tsugaru, the Korean straits, and Osumi-kaikyo. Although the US desires Japan to accept more collective security responsibility, it will not force them into a philosophical change from the pacifism imposed after World War II. Also, the United States will heed the rest of Asia's concern over a renewal of Japanese military might and maintain some Pacific presence as a check on potential Japanese power.

Northeast Asia is strategically important as four major powers' interests intersect at the Korean peninsula: USSR, China, US, and Japan. As Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union move toward liberalization, North Korea is among the decreasing group of communist stalwarts with Cuba and China. Claiming to be the sole legitimate government of Korea with 1.1 million men under arms, the North has been consistently hostile to the South. North Korea has the potential for increased subversion as the Republic of Korea (ROK) continues its economic and political progress. Strained from world isolation, the North has a growing concern over the South's diplomatic recognition by Poland and Hungary, spreading contacts with its old allies such as China, and an increasing gap in economic development.²⁷ North Korea's only real success economically may be as an arms exporter. The shift in power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Chong Il will pose a major challenge for the first communist dynasty. Seeing Japan, the US, and ROK as threats to survival, North Korea needed the USSR in the past before it could act militarily. So, the USSR held them

at bay. An even more irresponsible government under Kim Chong Il might act on its own in an attempt to reunite Korea forcibly on the North's terms. With Soviet preoccupation with its own internal conflicts, US withdrawal of combat troops from South Korea, ROK's increased acceptance by the North's former communist allies, and unrealized expectations among North Koreans from greater contact with the South, the North might attack to preserve the country from a popularly generated liberalization or reunification on Southern terms.

Although South Korea has made some remarkable economic strides, the political transformation has been rocky. ROK internal problems are evident in civil strife and if not addressed could ignite revolution. The United States' primary interest is to ensure that there is no hostile takeover of Korea. Even with the almost assured drawdown of deployed forces, the US will honor its treaty commitment to the ROK. Since the Korean peninsula is ethnically homogeneous, unification is on both Koreas' agenda, but on their own terms. The path to a progressive, German-style unification could be opened when Kim Il Song passes from the scene. If the Koreas ever do unite, the result could be a regional power "with potentially traumatic implications for regional security."²⁸

With its own flavor of perestroika and glasnost, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) experienced more success economically although continued economic growth is dependent on political stability. China has enormous economic potential. Its GNP

doubled in the 1980s and now is the second largest in Asia (not per capita). The only thing likely to stop Chinese growth would be war with the USSR. If the PRC determines that the USSR is weakened, it could attack to counter its own internal weakness and to acquire Soviet territory for its population. Isolationist by nature, China is unlikely to be dependent on overseas commerce due to its size, population, and raw materials. China needs technology from the developed world; they need China for its markets. In the near term, China will likely court Japanese assistance to aid in its own economic development. Population and geography ensure the PRC an increasingly important role in East Asia and the world. More pessimistically, Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. thinks that even with good luck, China will only reach mid-development by 2050. Politically, China's democratic trends seemed crushed at Tiananmen Square illustrating that the exposure to information is risky for an authoritarian society.²⁹ The desire by the Chinese people for more liberalization will create the potential for another internal flash point. Deng Xiaoping is the last ruler of the long-march generation with roots in the three key Chinese institutions: the party, the government, and the armed services. His death could accelerate liberalization. Besides the quest for recognition of human rights and democratic processes, China faces renewed nationalisms around its frontier. Inner Mongolia has ethnic and historical ties to Mongolia, a strategic buffer between the USSR and China. Also, Tibet, absorbed by the PRC in 1949, Manchuria,

and East Turkistan have separatist sentiments. As power in Beijing weakens, it will be more difficult to control these outlying areas. Additionally, China's eastern seaboard is branching out with economic initiatives with the outside world. Hong Kong and Macau may be potential flare-ups in the period leading to reunification with the PRC in 1997 and 1999, respectively. The most probable conflict for the People's Republic of China is internal secessionist movements of the fringe provinces, possible hesitance or resistance to central control in Hong Kong or Macau, or popular uprisings for liberalization. China's future holds more chaos to the point of break-up or return to political reforms.

Still, China is the key military power and threat in Asia with a 3.2 million man military that is increasing in capability, but currently lacks the ability to project its power. China is trying to build a blue-water navy. It already has a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability. Its military production provides a means to obtain hard currency by arms exportation including Silkworm missiles to Iran and Iraq and IRBMs to Saudi Arabia. Support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is indicative of expanding Chinese influence. China depicts its boundary to include most of the South China Sea. This area is ripe for Chinese conflict over minerals, oil, fishing, and critical SLOCs. There are also conflicting territorial claims with Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines over the strategically located Spratly and Paracel Islands. China and

Vietnam have already had one engagement over the Spratlys. Due to proximity, China could pose a significant threat to Japan, India, and Vietnam. Almost every other nation in Asia sees China as a threat.

The Taiwan Relations Act, an American law, promises aid to enable Taiwan to defend itself, primarily from its threat on the mainland. Both the PRC and Taiwan claim to be the sole legitimate government of China and consider the island of Taiwan as a Chinese province. Taiwan has made democratic and economic progress. The Chinese nationalist still control the government, but many of those are in their eighties. The population is approximately 85% native Taiwanese who prefer independence to some permanent link with the mainland. The greatest potential security threat is Taiwan's breaking with the current arrangement to establish an independent Taiwan, specifically declaring itself separate from mainland China. Given Taiwan's tremendous economic momentum, imagine the potential should mainland China ever combine with Taiwan.

With recent involvement in Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam is taking a more aggressive role in the region, but economic problems hamper military expansion. Richard Armitage, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, warns that "Vietnam is too large, too populous, and too poor, not to cause mischief" For a decade, its army of 1.1 million men was bogged down in occupation and conflict in Cambodia, completing withdrawal in September 1989, after

establishing a puppet government. Cambodia (Kampuchea) is the site of Soviet competition with China with the Soviets working through Vietnam. Four factions vie for power. The resistance may displace the communist puppet leadership in Cambodia, but the result could be less pleasing if the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge come to power. An aggressive Khmer Rouge would be a threat to Thailand or other ASEAN states. The United States has distanced itself from Southeast Asia since withdrawal from Vietnam. The Vietnam War experience firmly convinced Americans that the US has no strategic interest in Vietnam. Now, the United States is only a marginal player in Indochina, but probably will extend diplomatic recognition to Vietnam after the Cambodia question is settled and the MIA/POW issue is put to rest.³⁰

Burma (Myanma), the world's largest opium producer, is on the brink of bankruptcy and political turmoil. Recognizing its tremendous economic potential, Japan and South Korea support its military government, but Burma is ineligible for US assistance due to human rights violations. Burma has not known peace or unity since independence in 1948. Ethnic tribal minorities abound. The popular movements in this Buddhist majority state evolved into a full-scale revolution in 1988, crushed by the army dictatorship. The Karens, Shans, Kachins, and several other tribes continue their insurgency against the government. Opium financing of the civil war aggravates Burma's instability.³¹

Meanwhile, ASEAN members (Thailand, Indochina, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Brunei) have prospered. This

economic progress has been possible due to relative political stability. To further its economic expansion, Thailand wants to turn the Indochina battlefield into a marketplace. However, the ethnic Malay-Chinese conflict in Malaysia and internal problems in Indonesia threaten continued progress. Without a regional threat from Vietnam, ASEAN could disband. ASEAN, Indonesia in particular, sits astride the critical SLOCs in the region: the Strait of Malacca (with Malaysia and Singapore), Selat Lombok, Selat Sunda, and the Makassar Strait. US continued security assistance programs with ASEAN members are a means of enhancing SLOC security. Indonesia is playing an increasingly assertive role in the region with a growing military capability beyond requirements with no visible threat except possibly Vietnam. Indonesia will face the uncertain issue of political succession after over twenty years of Suharto. US interests would be hurt if any power, such as an aggressive Vietnam, dominated the ASEAN countries.³²

The Philippines' unpopular and unstable regime and internal civil strife generate an environment ripe for revolution. The conditions are not too different from those that led to popular uprising from social unrest in the Iranian revolution. There are two active insurgencies: the Moro National Liberation Front represents the Muslim minority and the more active communist insurgency, which is trying to regain the initiative. The Philippines is probably the most critical client in the Asia/Pacific region for American security assistance and nation-

building efforts. There have already been at least seven coup attempts and mutinies on President Corazon Aquino. Communist propaganda claims that Aquino counts on American bases for her political survival. Therefore, she publicly opposed retention of US bases. Their loss by 1994 will represent a tremendous financial blow to an already strapped economy, facing \$29 billion in foreign debt. The United States Department of Defense through its bases is the second largest employer in the Philippines, and effectively the seventh largest trade partner. There is probably no true opposition to American presence in the Philippines, and there is a recognized need for US presence in Asia. Simply put, the Philippines desire a foreign policy independent from the US, ASEAN, and Japan. Semantics may be the issue: renegotiation versus base extensions.³³ This time with the reduced Soviet threat, the United States will not stay in the Philippines at any price. Although not ideal, at least there are alternatives: Guam, Tinian, Singapore, Australia, or a combination are possible. Nevertheless, the US will retain strong ties with the Philippines, if for no other reason than Filipinos now constitute the largest Asian minority in the United States.

Australia and the United States have complementary interests. Australia has been a staunch ally through five wars in the 20th century. Australia is the power in the South Pacific. New Zealand's portion of the ANZUS pact is inoperative as result of the strained relations over US nuclear weapons. For all practical purposes, ANZUS is now two bilateral agreements between

the US and Australia, and between Australia and New Zealand. Of course, the United States would stand behind its defense obligations under the original ANZUS arrangement, if required. In reality, New Zealand is completely dependent on Australia. New Zealand imports almost all manufactured goods leaving its industrialization potential undeveloped. Its desire to establish its complete independence from Great Britain, Australia, and the United States, has focused on the nuclear issue. Other than the disconnect on nuclear weapons, the only other potential conflict on the horizon between New Zealand and Australia, among other claimants, is over natural resources in antarctica. Also, in the region, Papua New Guinea is the "would be" leader of the South Pacific Island Nations (SPIN). It has a diverse society with the associated tribal biases and untapped wealth in terms of potential natural resources. It faces a substantial separatist movement on the copper-rich island of Bougainville. Papua New Guinea considers itself an ally, and is also heavily dependent on Australia.

India unquestionably dominates the Indian sub-continent as a regional power. It has a tremendous military capability with 1.3 million men, third largest in world. India demonstrated its ability to use it in responding in a peacemaking role to civil war in Sri Lanka and a coup in the Maldives. It has an IRBM and an unacknowledged nuclear weapons capability. Its military buildup may exceed its true security requirements. According to Mark N. Katz of George Mason University, "India's often

belligerent attitude toward its weaker South Asian neighbors appears to indicate a desire to dominate where it can." Since its independence, India has been involved in wars with China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (during its liberation) and border clashes involving Kashmir, Sikkim, and Seachen.³⁴ India desires to control the Indian Ocean where the United States and its allies have strong interests in maintaining maritime access, largely to keep the flow of oil from the Gulf between the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Specifically, India does not want outside control of the Indian Ocean to include the United States. Also, India aspires to increase its naval power to establish a stronger link with Africa to the east. India remains focused on China and Pakistan (with all other Islamic nations) as its primary security threats.

India takes pride in being the largest democracy in the world, but it has the internal problems and civil strife inherent to a Third World country. China instituted a policy of encouraging only one child per family, which means India's population will surpass China's in the 21st century. The tremendous population growth multiplies the quality of life problems and unrest. As one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries, its real threat to security is internal, rising from the chronic chaos among ethnic and religious groups. Militant Sikhs in Punjab promote an independent Khalistan. India also faces constant secession threats from Kashmir and Assam. A major confrontation could explode at any time with Pakistan or

internally over increasingly important Kashmir.³⁵ The emigration from over-populated neighboring Bangladesh exasperates the situation in Assam.

Instability threatens India's smaller neighbors. Repetitive floods and cyclones have devastated Bangladesh compounding the enormous quality of life problems inherent with overpopulation of this Islamic nation. Border migration to and from India is a constant source of irritation for both nations. Bangladesh has contained its long-standing insurgency that spills over into India and Burma. Although peace-loving, there is potential future conflict with India over the Ganges waters should India try to divert the waters. Landlocked Nepal is dependent on India for trade routes for economic access to its imports. Nepal faces secession threats in certain Hindu areas and from the Gurkhas in Gorkhaland. Also landlocked, Bhutan fears losing its sovereignty and being absorbed by India like Sikkim in 1975.³⁶ Sri Lanka has been engulfed with an ethnic civil war between the Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese, inviting India's Peacekeeping Force to restore order in 1987. Unfortunately, the 50,000 Indians have stayed longer than Sri Lankans intended. With the breakdown of the 1990 Christmas cease fire, the Tamils are still pursuing forming Eelam, a separate state in the northern part of the island.

In Pakistan four significant ethnic groups pose secessionist threats. The Punjabis are a source of friction with India over Khalistan. Besides the smoldering conflict with India over the

Kashmir, the Sindhis and Pathans have nationalistic designs. The Baluchis, who also live in Afghanistan, have waged an armed insurgency against the Pakistani government for an independent Baluchistan. Also, there is a potential threat of an uprising from Islamic fundamentalists. Pakistan, an active supporter, if not the backbone of the Mujeheddin, has avoided direct intervention of its armed forces in Afghanistan. However, there is a significant refugee problem from the war. The United States has been a strong security assistance supporter of Pakistan, originally as a counter to Soviet aid to India. Consequently, Pakistan has built a strong military machine of 550,000 soldiers. However, the US suspended security assistance in October 1990, since the President could no longer certify, as required by Congress, that Pakistan does not have the bomb or is not developing nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear weapons employment in a regional conflict is greatest between India and Pakistan with worldwide implications.

The growth in their economic power will likely cause Asians to base future foreign policies on their economic interests. In the long term, the US will face many contingencies in Asia, but the likelihoods of direct military involvement seem low. Throughout the region, there is concern that if the US reduces its regional presence, it would only be a matter of time before Japan and China emerge as the hegemonic regional powers. If there is a threat universal to the region, it is China.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA

In his testimony before Congress in April 1990, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, also Commander of Desert Storm, described the Middle East and Southwest Asia, "as the most volatile region in the world." Regional and religious conflicts are a matter of everyday life. Oil and the strategic waterways and chokepoints make it a region of global interest. Much of the world's oil must traffic the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and Strait of Tiran to the Red Sea, or the Bab El Mandeb.³⁷ The United States has been continually involved in the region: Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, the Persian Gulf, and culminating in Desert Storm. Major issues confronting the region have expanded to include hostages, terrorism, water use, oil, and weapons of mass destruction. Yet, the central question in the region is the Palestinian issue and whether Arabs and Israelis can ever agree to peaceful coexistence. The region is politically unstable with Arab ethnic and tribal rifts as well as territorial sovereignty claims from colonial boundaries. Sudan, Iraq, and the Gulf States are subject to potential radical fundamentalist revolts like the one in Iran.

Throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia, countries are often "headed by regimes of uncertain staying power," according to Richard N. Haass of the National Security Council. States in the region with a history of recurring war do not recognize one another and have drastically different military capabilities.

The Arabs are even willing to start wars they know they cannot win militarily. There is a potential for a steady erosion of traditional regimes as they are forced to broaden their political systems. This is particularly applicable to the ruling elites of the Gulf States who have enjoyed such oil prosperity. Although in Saudi Arabia, the ultimate welfare state, there is currently little room for complaint over the quality of life. Its oil wealth finances home loans, medical care, and other services for the people. Yet, there are rising expectations for democratic reform. On the other hand, the non-oil exporting Arab states are experiencing increased political instability from the social chaos of rapid population growth, educated but unemployed youth, and an absence of economic growth. The youthful Arab populations are growing more dissatisfied with the status quo.³⁸

The Palestinian issue is fundamentally one of territory for peace: establishment of some Palestinian homeland and Arab recognition of Israel and its right to exist. UN Resolution 242 calls for a separate Palestinian state as the means for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The principle territories in question include the Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza strip, all occupied by Israel after the 1967 War. However, even Arab countries may not truly be eager for an independent Palestinian state. The creation of a Palestinian state besides Jordan and Israel will not lessen the region's instability. Furthermore, Jordanians must recognize and fear that in time such a Palestinian state would eventually consume Jordan.³⁹

Any solution must accommodate both Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms, yet neither is apparently ready to accommodate the other. There is no internal mandate for compromise leaving the situation far from being ripe for resolution. No one supports the status quo, but its inertia comes from an absence of consensus on anything else. The Palestinian Intifada uprising further polarizes the Arab-Israeli issue. In the aftermath of Desert Storm, the world community will be ready to address the Palestinian question. But, neither the Israelis nor Palestinians have indicated a willingness to compromise. Israel maintains that if it were to withdraw to pre-67 borders, its frontier would be indefensible leaving its territorial integrity vulnerable. Israel also recognizes that Desert Storm and participation in the coalition with the United States leaves Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt stronger and more experienced militarily than previously. Israel must contain its hostility or the next major Arab-Israeli conflict could be more costly than anything previous. Internally, Israel also must recognize that by the mid-90s, its population will be only 78% Jewish.⁴⁰ The United States could possibly coerce Israel into some sort of settlement since withdrawal of support could threaten Israel's survival as a country. Still, it is difficult to foresee that the US would ever back Israel into that corner.

Another Middle-East/Southwest Asia phenomena is the Jihad or Holy War. It is an umbrella cry for mobilization of the people for many Muslim conflicts. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini reignited

the Jihad against the Christian West, the Jews, and the Muslim monarchs. The Jihad left a trail of terrorism as its principle means of execution through the last decade. Libya's Colonel Qadhafi exported the call for Jihad throughout Africa against non-Muslim rulers such as President Mobutu in Zaire. Most recently, Saddam Hussein called for a Jihad to repel the infidels who challenged Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

Egypt is the largest, most advanced Arab country, but it is plagued by international debt, population growth, and significant food, housing, and water shortages. Its greatest threat is internal stemming from socio-economic development problems and potential Sunni fundamentalism. It also faces threats from neighbors, Libya and Sudan. Egypt is obviously concerned about being forgotten in the midst of US-USSR reconciliation.⁴¹ It has been the outcast of Arab politics from the Camp David accords and peace with Israel that returned the Sinai and instituted a multi-national peacekeeping force there. After Camp David, the US has been a security assistance benefactor for both Egypt and Israel. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may look to Egypt to play a major role as the Arab muscle in the Persian Gulf's post-Desert Storm regional stability.

Israel's northern neighbor, Lebanon, has been in a state of anarchy with a bleak future after sixteen years of civil war. In its multifactioned civil war, Syria intervened to support the Lebanese Muslims, Iraq aided the Lebanese Christians, the PLO was a major instigator of trouble, and Israel also supported the

Christians and established a security zone for its own frontier. Frequent exchanges with the PLO in this area indicate this is still an active conflict. Syria, with its sponsored faction, may serve as the ultimate stabilizing force in Lebanon. The void also could be filled by Shiite fundamentalists, the largest Islamic group in the country. After the Marine Barracks bombing in 1983, the US has had no interest in reentering Lebanon. Should a legitimate government ever be established, the United States could be supportive diplomatically, but would leave active involvement to another, such as France.

Syria has been the most hostile antagonist to Israel. So far, it has managed to avoid war with Israel over Lebanon. It alienated much of the Arab world by supporting Iran against Iraq. It is also a recognized state sponsor of international terrorism. Syria is the latest of strange bedfellows for the United States in the Desert Storm coalition. Internally, the main threat could come from Sunni fundamentalists especially when President Assad's succession comes into question.

Meanwhile, Jordan is at risk from internal threats in terms of survival as a kingdom. It is the seemingly good-intentioned neighbor that tries to please everybody and effectively pleases no one, lending its public endorsement to Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. The monarch's attempt at granting some popular representation saw significant fundamentalist gains in recent elections. With Palestinians comprising approximately 60% of the

population and increasing, Jordan could become the de facto Palestine.

The Iran-Iraq War revealed the transforming nature of Third World conflict as a vivid example of military leaders gradually developing an ability to move large forces and conduct ground and air operations. Following its costly eight year war, Iraq replaced Iran as the dominant military power in the region and became the greatest threat to interests in the Persian Gulf. The radical Iraqi leader's infamy is now well known: a sponsor of terrorism, the use of chemicals against his own Kurdish population, occupation and pillaging of Kuwait, and indiscriminate SCUD missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel's population centers. The immediate question is the future of Iraq after its internal unrest from Desert Storm. Although having suffered a decisive military defeat, Saddam Hussein is a martyr to the Arab masses for standing up to a superpower and apparently returning the Palestinian issue to the world agenda. A change in leadership is essential. Shiite majority rule offers a logical alternative, but it also poses a potential fundamentalist threat if linked to Iran. The Kurdish population and their quest for autonomy also must be addressed as this may be an opportunity for a Kurdish state from within Iraq's frontiers.

Desert Storm was a display of unity among the GCC states (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). Although dominating oil reserves in the region, the Persian Gulf states are almost indefensible strategically and

will most likely agree to some outside presence following the war. The United States will likely accept some responsibility for rebuilding a post-war post-Hussein Iraq. Likewise, there will surely be some continuing US commitment to Kuwait and the GCC. There probably will be some all-Arab force left in Kuwait to help insure the peace. The US will maintain a significant naval presence in the region. Further, there is likely to be some sizeable post-war US logistics contingent in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia involved in the recovery, redeployment, or transfer of equipment. Additionally, Kuwait already has some rebuilding plans that include US Army Engineers. Meanwhile, Yemen, just reunited from civil war, is another potential threat to tranquility on the Arabian peninsula.

Iran hopes to regain its status as the regional power broker following Desert Storm and reoccupy the void left by the destruction of the Iraqi military. It was active on the international diplomatic scene as a peacemaker. As a terrorist supporter, it will remain a major threat, especially to the Gulf states. It can be financed by oil and has a large population prone to respond to nationalistic or Islamic calls to mobilization. However, the Iranian revolution has failed; the inept current government cannot govern and is more oppressive than the Shah.⁴² The refugee problem from Afghanistan aggravates internal instability. Also, any Kurdish uprising in Iraq probably would spill over into Iran. Although Iran still paints the United States as "the Great Satan," there is likely to

be some future rapprochement. Iran could return to progressive development once it rids itself of fanatical fundamentalist control.

Afghanistan's economy is in shambles from civil war and the flight of one-third of its population as refugees to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. This is the only remaining exception to the new cooperation between the US and the USSR in that they "both continue to support their respective protagonists with military and economic aid." So far, the mujeheddin have been unable to oust the Soviet sponsored regime by force. Recently, they have returned to fighting among themselves as much as against the puppet government in Kabul. Meanwhile, the Afghan government resorted to terror to control its remaining population.

Afghanistan is prone to continued instability since every state it borders (Iran, Pakistan, USSR, and PRC) has internal problems with regionally oriented ethnic groups that extend beyond the borders.⁴³ Further, contributing to the instability besides the civil war, Afghanistan is criminally undermined as the second largest opium producer in the world.

The defeat of Iraq might be another first step toward peace in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. However, the deep animosities throughout the region are unlikely to give peace a chance. The United States will remain tied to the region and its problems by intrinsic interests, oil, and the security of the SLOCs.

AFRICA

Africa is the world's basket case, left behind by global economic progress. Its political instability is rooted in tribal and religious disputes that undermine nations. Local disputes rage in the Horn of Africa, Chad, Western Sahara, and southern Africa. During the past thirty years, rulers were regularly overthrown, but the new regimes seldom produced change, especially in terms of improving the lot in life for its citizens or solving the underlying problems.

Eighteen of the world's 25 poorest countries are in Africa. The debt outlook is dismal with over fifty countries in financial difficulty. By 1990 African debts (excluding South Africa) totaled \$260 billion and will top \$600 billion by 2000. The basic problem is the size of debt comparable to the African economies. For example, the average African debt service ratio is 40% (debt repayment plus interest, divided by exports), Cameroon and Madagascar exceed 100%, and Sudan exceeds 300%. Consequently, few states can attempt to repay debts, a condition that does not attract new investment.⁴⁴ Arms acquisition and armed conflict further drain these meager economies, especially in Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan, and Mozambique.

Africa is just beginning to see a population explosion, which will create greater instability from food shortages and disease. The impact of AIDS on the African leadership is staggering. The primary crisis that transcends the continent is hunger. It is possible that armed conflict could result from a world food

crisis. Economic aid to the region has stalled. Africans conclude that no one in the world really cares enough to act to avert disaster. A hands-off approach has been easy in Africa for the superpowers. Neither the US nor the USSR has had or will have much impact although Africa borders strategically important SLOCs and holds rich mineral deposits and oil needed by the industrialized world. General Ollsegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian head of state, warns " . . . for as long as Africa continues to be ignored, in fact, that may be the tension, the major area of conflict for the 21st century . . ." as potential for increased conflicting interests among Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

Africa north of the Sahara is predominately Muslim. In 1989, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia formed the Arab Mahgreb Union, an African Arab common market to better deal with the European Community. However, there has been little effectiveness to date. The main sub-regional conflict is in Morocco's Western Sahara with the Polisario insurgents seeking separate rule. The conflict strained relations between Algeria and Morocco. Recognizing that war obviously would be in neither's economic interest, they reestablished diplomatic relations in May 1988. Still, the Polisario is receiving significant support from Algeria. In fact, several African countries recognize the Polisario's declared independent government. United Nations efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict have been unsuccessful. The United States maintains an

interest in Morocco for use of air bases and communications sites as well as its strategic location on the southern shoulder of the Strait of Gibraltar. If King Hassan loses US assistance, it could topple his rule.⁴⁶ Tunisia, host to PLO leadership, is often embroiled in the Arab-Israeli conflict and could face an internal fundamentalist challenge. Internal unrest in both Mali and Mauritania turned violent in the last two years. Recently, the army in Mali fired on pro-democracy demonstrators who demanded an end to one-party rule.

Libya has consistently been the most controversial of the northern African states. Colonel Muammar Qadhafi attempts to gain influence with anyone who will listen. Although subdued by the 1986 US air strike for his support of terrorism, he has been the loud and unsuccessful mouthpiece of Arab unity. While that air strike did not stop terrorism, it sent a message to those sponsoring terrorism. The world has kept Qadhafi at arms length, but somehow, he has survived instability at home. Libya has oil wealth and land, but lacks population. A conciliatory change is imminent in a post-Qadhafi Libya that will seek a new identity. Neighboring, Sudan is the largest country in Africa. It is a tremendous agricultural reservoir and has untapped oil and mineral potential. Yet, it threatens Egypt with potential control of the Nile's headwaters.⁴⁷ Sudan has been hampered with an ethnic civil war between the Arab northern two-thirds of the country and the southern third of African Christians. Sudan could be the first war in which food is a weapon since both sides

have been accused of cutting off food supplies and starving civilians. This war and the weapons proliferation could divide the country into regional self-rule.

The Horn of Africa or East Africa is the most strategically important sub-region by controlling the Bab el Mandeb at tiny Djibouti, connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Although not without its share of internal problems from the highest population growth rate in the world, Kenya is the most stable country on the Horn with the strongest economy in Africa. Political conflict in Northeast Africa has been the major obstacle to social and economic development. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought over the disputed Ogaden area since Somalia's independence in 1961. The region has been an international football. Ethiopia, once supported by the US when the Soviets aided Somalia, switched allegiance, so the US then adopted and supported Somalia. In January 1991, insurgents ousted President Siad Barre who had been friendly to the US leaving Somali future in question. Ethiopia is the poorest country in Africa, but has the largest standing army on the continent with over 300,000 men.⁴⁸ The civil war and the Tigre and Eritrea insurgencies in Ethiopia have halted any political or economic progress. Although they stem from internal causes, the conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia have cross border implications and involve factions supported from neighboring states.

Sub-Sahara Africa is geographically remote with even more extreme economic, population growth, and quality of life problems than the rest of the continent. In the last decade, there were coups or attempted coups in Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and Upper Volta and continuing insurgencies in Angola, Chad, Uganda, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Worse than economically stagnant, most Sub-Saharan countries have regressed and are worse off today than a decade ago.⁴⁹ Libyan-backed insurgents deposed President Habre from power in Chad after a decade of civil war, which included both French military and US security assistance for the government. President Doe was killed in Liberia's civil war in 1990 in which the US declined to intervene in this internal struggle in spite of America's special relationship with the country. Although the civil war spilled over into Sierra Leone, a degree of stability may be coming to Liberia with the presence of Nigerian peacekeeping forces. As the regional leader, Nigeria's own limited economic progress has been from oil revenues. Its military leadership promises a return to democracy with elections in 1992.

US policy for southern Africa was to safeguard access to strategic minerals and to contain communism. Africa is the source for over two dozen critical minerals. The United States imports 90% of its requirements for four essential strategic minerals (chromium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum) from Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa. Also, 31% of the required vanadium, for which there is no substitute in titanium alloys in

aircraft, comes from South Africa. Chromium and Cobalt are key for superalloy defense and aerospace production. There are alternate sources for all except cobalt, but it would take the total production from all other sources to meet US requirements. The US has already started importing platinum from the USSR as an alternative. The requirement for cobalt cannot be met without Zaire and Zambia. Any conflict interrupting supply distribution of these strategic minerals for even a short time would generate a crisis.⁵⁰

If it were not for its strategic minerals, the US probably would avoid Zaire. President Mobutu is probably the only force holding Zaire together. After Mobutu, leadership succession will increase its instability. Democratic, diamond-rich Botswana is somewhat stable and a bright spot in the region. Mineral-rich Zambia, the sick nation of southern Africa, remains of special concern to US. It is also vital as a regional transportation hub for rail routes converging from Angola via Zaire, from South Africa and Mozambique via Zambia, and from Tanzania. Zimbabwe, also a mineral rich one-party state, is one of the few countries in Africa that can actually feed itself. It considers Mozambique as a serious security threat. With anti-communist resistance making gains, the USSR withdrew its advisors from Mozambique, Eastern Europe abandoned Zimbabwe, and Cuba is withdrawing from Angola. These African countries may now seek help from the US, Japan, or Europe. Angola is the only place where the Reagan doctrine of supporting anti-communist insurgencies is still

active. Yet, Savimba and the National Union for Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), even with captured tanks, have been unable to overcome the government's Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA).⁵¹ Meanwhile, neighboring Namibian independence derived by negotiated peace is a UN success story.

South Africa's Apartheid with the resulting racial conflict is almost totally internal. The de Klerk government has taken some steps toward easing the racial barriers; however, the right to vote, which would lead to majority rule or at least shared governing, is yet to come. Although reforms are forthcoming, progress may be still too slow to prevent an all-out guerilla war of blacks against whites. Of course, the black factions would have to stop fighting among themselves first. If South Africa is ever politically stable, it could be the undisputed regional power, but currently it lacks legitimacy. The United States will keep a watchful eye to ensure that the Cape of Good Hope SLOC does not fall under hostile control, but there is little threat today.⁵² This is critical since most modern oil tankers are too large for the Suez Canal.

Africa will pose new challenges in the 21st century. Extreme poverty and hunger highlight the severe conditions throughout the continent. The more this sleeping giant is disturbed, the greater its effects on the rest of the world. Its potential markets and resources remain virtually untapped. The United States will focus largely on Africa's strategic minerals and the critical chokepoint dominated at the Horn.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

In the Americas, Surinam and Cuba are the only countries that remain untouched by democracy in 1991. But, the Latin American democratic beginnings are fragile, pitted against regional problems of drugs, population growth, urbanization, unemployment, population migration away from conflicts, illegal immigration, capital flight, guerrillas, death squads, paramilitary criminals, and narcoterrorism. Latin America currently has the highest density of terrorist incidents in the world. There has been a general absence of economic growth throughout the region although Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile do show some promise. The \$400 billion debt problem, already serious, could grow to have greater security and political implications. Political unrest in Latin America has not been primarily a function of the East-West conflict, but of ruling elites' failure to address basic needs of their people. The United States will retain interests throughout the Americas based on geography alone. Other US core interests in the region are promoting democratic aspirations and social programs, investment and its potential economic growth, strategic minerals (antimony, tin, manganese, bauxite, and oil), and shared concerns over drugs and immigration. For example, the US gets 96% of its bauxite from Latin America.⁵³ Besides economic interest, Latin America will become increasingly important interfacing with US domestic concerns. However, Latin Americans believe that North Americans are not serious about helping to solve its overwhelming problems

of economic development, human rights, and drugs. This is underscored by what they see as meager assistance programs compared to those granted to other regions. They do not think that the United States has applied a consistent measure to the balance of economic assistance and support for governments who are anything but model protectors of human rights. Also, they do not see the US making any progress in curbing its domestic demand for illicit drugs.

South America's drug war transcends national boundaries. Peru produces 65% of the world's cocoa; Bolivia grows 25%; and Columbia refines 80% of the cocaine that enters the United States. Insurgents and narco-guerrillas are active in drug trafficking in Peru and Columbia as a means to finance their campaigns.⁵⁴ In Peru, the Sendero Luminosa, the Shining Path, Maoist insurgency controls the cocoa fields to finance its vision of establishing an Indian utopia. Other insurgent groups are also active in Peru. Meanwhile, Peru rejected the 1990 US aid package because of the "strings" attached. Fighting for its national survival, Columbia is at the point of national ruin over its bloody war with the powerful drug cartels and its long-standing insurgencies. Its criminal justice system is incapacitated in dealing with the drug cartels. The M19 insurgents accepted an invitation to participate in the electoral process and won nineteen of seventy legislative seats at the polls. But, like Peru, other insurgencies remain active.

It is difficult for either Peru or Columbia to attract outside investment due to the instability, drug wars, and insurgencies.

Brazil is the leading candidate for regional power, and its developmental progress is a potential success story. Argentina, showing its historical enmity with Brazil, tries to behave like a regional power. The US relationship with Argentina is still smarting over support of the UK in the Falklands/ Malvinas War in 1982. Chile, another challenger for regional power status, has an emerging strong economy. Nevertheless, South America is not without its traditional boundary disputes. Venezuela, already an oil exporter, claims an area potentially rich as an oil, mineral, and hydroelectric source in Guyana. The disputed territory and resources represent two-thirds of Guyana, west of the Essequibo River. Chile, Argentina, and Great Britain have conflicting claims over antarctica, which could be important for future mineral development. Ecuador and Peru dispute an area, perceived to be a rich energy resource. Additionally, landlocked Bolivia has a long-standing desire for access to the sea, stemming from the 1883 War of Pacific when Chile defeated Bolivia and Peru. Other boundary disputes persist between Argentina and Uruguay, Brazil and both Paraguay and Uruguay, and between Surinam and both French Guiana and Guyana.⁵⁵ Colonel Qadhafi has been benefactor to Colonel Bouterse, leader of Surinam's repressive government. This relationship generates concern that Libya could use Surinam in an indirect attack on France by striking interests

in neighboring Guyana or French Guiana. Bouterse also faces an anti-government resistance.

Central America will always be very important to the US, again based on proximity. The sub-region has been war-torn for the past decade with insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Democratically elected governments in El Salvador have survived through a devastating civil war against leftist guerrillas although societal inequalities persist and the criminal justice system is bankrupt. The insurgent Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has not eased its pressure, but its outside support may finally be in jeopardy. Guatemala recently survived another coup attempt after having dealt with its insurgency very well without US aid, restricted during the early 1980s due to its human rights violations. The insurgency is still active and may be growing with the added threat from narcotrafficking.

The US-supported anti-communist resistance could not win on the battlefield in Nicaragua, but the Sandinistas fell by losing at the polls. From the US perspective, the democratic Nicaragua must succeed. One new challenge is to ensure that the tremendous arsenal accumulated under Sandinista rule does not fall into the wrong hands.

Panama is still in disarray from Operation Just Cause. While Noriega had few friends, the US invasion in Operation Just Cause did not sit well with the Latin neighbors. The Panamanians are frustrated that their high expectations for immediate results

have not been met. It will take time for their young government to learn how to govern. Rebuilding and economic growth are already evident, but so are an increase in crime and drugs. Although the Panama Canal has diminished in any real strategic value, the United States is committed to enhancing Panama's economic recovery and political stability while simultaneously working toward complete turn over of the Canal by 2000.

Still closer to US borders, Mexico is at a crossroads between future prosperity and ruin. With its oil revenues combined with US investment, Mexico has the potential to join the NICs. Its current reform-minded administration has pledged to do something about the social ills throughout the country. Otherwise, Mexico is potentially the most serious problem child in Central America, mired in political instability, debt, and social upheaval on the verge of a potential popular uprising. It is in a tailspin generated by inflation, corruption, and drugs. Mexico could see civil war or rebellion, which could produce a regime hostile to the US and potentially pose a threat. The resulting flood of refugees might cause the US to seal its borders to control refugee camps and deter cross-border incursions.⁵⁶

The Caribbean island nations share their poverty despite a thriving tourist trade. The cost of providing security is beyond the resources of these debt-burdened mini-states. The island states feel the need to establish some form of military force or constabulary as a symbol of political independence. Although a drain on meager resources, these local forces add to internal

social order and stability under the guise of protecting borders. However, no single Caribbean nation (except Cuba) can seriously safeguard itself.⁵⁷ Grenada was the beneficiary of the United States rescue mission that rid the island of a brutal dictator and Cuban influence. Haiti had been the hold-out with Cuba as a non-democratic government in the Caribbean. Yet, its first elected government took office in February 1991, surviving a pre-inauguration coup attempt.

Cuba has the sole potent military force in the Caribbean. Nonetheless, it must deal with its growing economic problems with diminished political legitimacy especially considering its Eastern Europe allies' recent repudiation of their communist ideology. Fidel Castro, once the self-appointed leader of the non-aligned movement, is left all alone, facing the potential loss of six billion dollars in annual Soviet support. After apparently posing a challenge to Castro's leadership, General Ochoa, who commanded Cuban troops in Angola, was publicly executed for alleged drug trafficking. A coup could be likely since General Ochoa's execution left the military indignant and many Soviet-trained officers endorse Gorbachev's reforms. Cuba is also ripe for a possible popular rebellion to cast aside its communist yoke like Romania.⁵⁸ Even if Castro is not deposed forcibly, the question of leadership succession must address reforms that could return Cuba to Latin American acceptance and US recognition.

Although not always first in priority, Latin America will remain key to US interests, especially in encouraging economic and democratic development. The region is still beset with great internal problems which due to proximity tend to spill over into the United States.

CONCLUSION: WHICH CONFLICTS?

The world has grown smaller. Nations are moving toward democracy and economic development. Nationalism may be the sole surviving ideology. Unfortunately, many third world states are left behind and are ripe with turmoil, internal strife, and old conflicts. Aspirations for political and economic growth challenge the traditional institutions. The North-South gap is more prominent. Arms proliferation places well-armed states throughout the world. There is potential for new fervor to radical regimes associated with quick promises for a share of prosperity. The new world is an unstable place with many potential areas of conflict.

The United States must look for alternatives to committing troops that still contribute to realizing our interests. Future Third World conflicts will require many different responses. Most responses will not be as combatants, but through nation building and security assistance. The US should avoid direct military commitment where other allies can do the job.⁵⁹

The United States will remain an active security partner in NATO. If the alliance accepts a greater security role outside

NATO, then employment of the ACE to a NATO fringe contingency would include American participation. Although internal disorder and minor conflicts are possible in Eastern Europe, unilateral US intervention is not plausible. Although, US participation as part of the ACE is conceivable should NATO intervene in a peacemaking or peacekeeping role in a conflict between two Eastern European states. While the US and NATO will stay out of any internal Turkish conflicts and continue to promote peace with Greece, NATO would be on tap to respond to any aggression against Turkey from Syria, Iraq, or Iran, unless it is an escalation of the Kurdish or Armenian desires for separation.

There is no combination of circumstances that would lead to US involvement in a Soviet internal conflict. Further, should some internally induced conflict spill over into bordering states, the US would abstain. The United States would avoid involvement in a Sino-Soviet War, no matter who initiated it. Even if there were a possibility for intervention, neither antagonist would need or want American assistance. However, since such a conflict would include potential use of nuclear weapons, the US would monitor it very closely to preserve its own strategic security. Therefore, involvement of US forces in Europe, Eastern Europe, or the Soviet Union is unlikely.

The most serious potential conflict in Asia would be a Sino-Japanese War. The United States will come to Japan's aid by treaty, not to mention by economic interest. Japan will continue to have primary charge for any hostile attempt to interdict the

SLOCs within its 1,000 mile radius of responsibility. The US will respond to any Japanese request for assistance to keep those SLOCs open.

Our treaty commitment with the Republic of Korea remains a basis for possible military conflict in Northeast Asia. The degree of involvement would depend largely on the status of US troop drawdown although there is likely to be some presence as long as there are two Koreas. US ground forces, if not in country, may not be required. Although slightly outnumbered, ROK forces probably can handle the ground war with US air and naval assistance. The United States will sit out the ground campaign of a new Korean War, if circumstances permit. If US troops are still stationed in ROK, then they probably would be augmented; but the bulk of the ground campaign would still fall to ROK forces to execute.

As with the Soviet Union, there is no combination of circumstances that would result in direct US involvement in China's internal conflicts. If Taiwan and the mainland came to hostilities, the US will avoid direct involvement. Besides a potential Sino-Soviet conflict, Chinese conflicts along the borders are possible with India, Pakistan, Laos, and Vietnam. In all of these, the US will avoid direct intervention. The US will be receptive to a supportive relationship for India. America will be ready to respond to a Thai or probably any other ASEAN request for assistance should it be threatened by an aggressive China or Vietnam.

Any Chinese, Vietnamese, or any other hostile actor who attempted to interdict the southeast Asian SLOCs or even the South China Sea chokepoints vicinity of the Spratly Islands will cross the line of interdicting US interests. The US will respond to ensure free navigation of the seas as a means to maintain open access to markets and to resources. This includes direct involvement in support of Malaysia or Indonesia to secure the SLOCs.

There is great potential for US involvement with the Philippines. The Manila Pact and a bilateral treaty commit the US to the defense of the Philippines from any outside aggression. The United States will not respond in a Philippine conflict over its unsettled claims in the Spratly Islands. As long as there are American bases in the Philippines, the United States probably will become involved in any internal conflict that threatens the bases, US personnel, or property. To preserve the legitimately elected government, the US will extend further assistance if requested by the government unless the government itself becomes repressive.

Direct US involvement in the Indian sub-continent is improbable. The United States also will avoid direct involvement in another India-Pakistan war, or the internal conflicts that are likely for all states in the sub-region. The US will be eager to renew its security assistance efforts in Pakistan, and potentially extend them to Bangladesh along nation building initiatives, to assist in their internal conflict resolution.

No end is in sight for violence in the Middle East. Unless Israel makes some concession on the Palestinian issue or at least provides some progress in terms of the humane treatment of Palestinians in the occupied lands, there will eventually be another Arab-Israeli War. If Egypt is included, it would pose a tremendous dilemma for the US who could not continue to support both. Withdrawal of support for Israel could jeopardize its survival; withdrawal of support from Egypt would drive it back to the extremist end of the spectrum. It will be the United States resolve to work diplomatically to restore peace as soon as possible without committing forces. The United States would provide security assistance and nation-building efforts to support stabilization of the existing governments in Egypt and Jordan to counter their significant internal turbulence. The United States will maintain its hands-off approach toward Lebanon for years to come. The most likely military actions in this vicinity will be rescue operations for embassies, potential responses to terrorism, or the extraction or self-defense of peacekeeping forces in the Sinai.

The Persian Gulf will remain a matter of United States interest to ensure the free flow of oil and open SLOCs. The US Naval presence will remain in the Gulf. Consequently, given the instability of the region, it will remain a potential area for future conflict, although popular opinion will sway against American troops' fighting another Gulf War.

Africa offers a greater potential source of conflict than in years past. The United States must be aware that an African leader that has agreed to provide the US military access rights, may ask for military support to preempt or counter an actual or potential threat to his regime.⁵⁰ Having just lost a friend in Somalia, the United States might respond favorably to such a request from Morocco, Senegal, or Kenya, especially if the threat is externally supported. Hostile control over the Horn and possible interdiction of free sea navigation could prompt US intervention in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, or even Yemen.

Sub-Sahara Africa is geographically remote such that there appears little or no US role for intervention. The US will react to preserve access to strategic minerals in Zaire, Zimbabwe, or Zambia, although the immediate steps should be to increase security assistance and nation-building efforts, and to improve alternative sources for strategic minerals. Commitment of US forces would only result if another friendly nation did not intercede to preserve access to critical resources. The United States will not become involved in South Africa's potential racial civil war.

There are no identifiable outside threats to Latin America that would activate the Rio Pact. While the United States would not intervene in an internal Cuban conflict, it will respond, if required, to renewed Cuban adventurism in the hemisphere. Latin America and the Caribbean are possible exceptions to US reluctance to intervene to assist democratically elected

governments experiencing internal threats. Regardless, the United States will remain actively involved throughout Latin America with increased security assistance and nation-building efforts. This assistance will be aimed at enabling these young democracies to defend themselves against internal threats while working to improve the inequities, quality of life, and human rights concerns that underpin internal strife. If Surinam returns to overly repressive actions, the United States would respond to a threat to a neighbor, or to US or friendly citizens. Closer to US borders, Mexico is another possible exception since any Mexican revolution is likely to involve the United States in some manner.⁵ The United States is already actively involved supporting the war on drugs in Latin America. Escalation to the employment of US troops is possible even in a greater role than in Bolivia in the late 1980s. Involvement to the point of that in Tom Clancey's Clear and Present Danger is not unimaginable with the commitment of ground combat forces, naval air interdiction of smuggling aircraft, the employment of precision guided munitions against cartel strongpoints, etc. However, the US will seek to stay in a supporting role.

There are other probable situations for United States military action almost anywhere in the Third World. The first type scenario could be United States response to a terrorist action, or to preempt a terrorist action. The United States is likely to become more aggressive in responding to terrorist actions with force involving state sponsors such as Libya, Iran,

or Syria. Another scenario is a potential rescue operation like the two recently executed in Africa, in which embassy staffs and citizens were safely extracted from Liberia and Somalia. Rescue operations may include the extraction of citizens of other friendly nations, even Soviet citizens from Somalia.

Additionally, given the initial success on the outcome of Desert Storm, the United Nations may take a more aggressive role in collective police of threatening world situations. So, the United States could be further involved as part of a UN action to foreclose a regional conflict.

The new overriding threat to United States' national interests is instability. Regional conflicts are potentially anywhere and everywhere in the world's future. The United States will continue to accept its responsible place, not as the world's policeman, but as the only true superpower with a vision for a safe and secure world. Recognizing that every situation and every country is viewed in its own light, diplomatically, the US should work toward greater consistency in promoting the values held dear. Additionally, the US must be more active in nation building to attack the root problems for internal conflict while improving internal defense through security assistance. In the military build-down, the US must retain enough teeth and develop the strategic lift to sustain its power projection capability. Regional conflicts can either stem from long-standing problems either internal to a state or between states, or they may arise quickly with little warning. US interests are so diverse in this

interdependent world that it is impossible to predict all military threats for the next fifteen years. But the potential hotspots forewarn that ". . . you will be hearing of wars and rumors of wars" (Matthew 24:6)

ENDNOTES

1. Harold Brown, "Choices for the 1990s: Preserving American Security Interests Through the Century's End," in America's Global Interests: A New Agenda, ed. by Edward K. Hamilton, p. 131. Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990, pp. 33-34.
2. David F. Ronfeldt, Three Dark Pieces, p. i.
3. John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000, p. 180. Thomas H. Etzold, "The Strategic Environment of the Twenty-first Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planners," Strategic Review, Spring 1990, p. 26.
4. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "The 21st Century: American Foreign Policy Challenges," in Hamilton, p. 258. Joseph F. Coates and Jennifer Jarratt, What Futurists Believe, p. 190. Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future: The Post-1989 World, p. 162; cited with permission.
5. Future Security Environment Working Group, The Future Security Environment, p. 13.
6. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, p. 9. Janne Nolan and Albert D. Wheelon, "Third World Ballistic Missiles," Scientific American, August 1990, pp. 34,39. Harvey J. McGeorge, "Bugs, Gas, and Missiles," Defense and Foreign Affairs, May-June 1990, pp. 18-20. James R. Corcoran, COL, Asia-Pacific Regional Strategic Appraisal; cited with permission.
7. Ivan F. Lamb, LTC, The Nineties and Beyond, p. 18.
8. Harry E. Rothman, COL, The U. S. Army, Strategic Formulation, and Force Planning: Past, Present, Future, pp. 239-240.
9. Regional Conflict Working Group, Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict, p. 64.
10. Robert S. McNamara, "Traditional Values, High-Leverage Issues," in An Agenda for the 21st Century, ed. by Rushworth M. Kidder, p. 102.
11. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, p. 17. Kemp, p. 45.

12. Helen Kitchen, Some Guidelines on Africa for the Next President, p. 94. Regional Conflict Working Group, p. 25. John Chipman, "Third World Politics and Security in the 1990s: 'The World Forgetting, by the World Forgot'?", The Washington Quarterly, p. 152.
13. Richard N. Haass, "Regional Order on the 1990s: The Challenge of the Middle East." The Washington Quarterly, p. 184. Mark N. Katz, "Beyond the Reagan Doctrine: Reassessing U.S. Policy Toward Regional Conflicts," The Washington Quarterly, p. 174.
14. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power, pp. 199-200.
15. Kemp, p. 44.
16. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War." Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1989/90, p 15.
17. Michael Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Summer 1990, pp. 57-71.
18. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism." Foreign Affairs, Winter 1989/90, p. 3. Walter Laqueur, Soviet Union 2000, p. 181.
19. Brzezinski, p. 4. John J. Mears, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic, p. 41.
20. Katz, p. 171.
21. Peter Schwartz, in Coates and Jarratt, What Futurists Believe, p. 258.
22. Snow, p. 95.
23. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, p. 518. Richard L. Armitage, "U.S. Security in the Pacific in the 21st Century," Strategic Review, pp. 11-14. Regional Conflict Working Group, p. 12. Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1989/90, p. 110.
24. Corcoran, 16 January 1991.
25. Kennedy, p. 466. Scalapino, p. 107.

26. Etzold, p. 27. Perry M. Smith, MG(Ret), "Developing a Long-Term National Strategy," Airpower Journal, Summer 1989, p. 9.
27. Scalapino, p. 96.
28. Kemp, p. 35.
29. Kennedy, p. 455-456. Offense-Defense Working Group, The Future of Containment, p. 49. Nye, p. 139. Ronfeldt, p. 6.
30. Kemp, p. 35. Armitage, p. 17. Scalapino, p. 99.
31. Josef Silverstein, "Civil War and Rebellion in Burma," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, March 1990, pp. 114-121.
32. Katz, pp. 172-173.
33. John Hill, "Philippine Communists: Poised for a Comeback?" Armed Forces Journal International, January 1991, p. 27. Justus Maria Van der Kroef, Aquino's Philippines, p. 11. Corcoran, 25 January 1991.
34. Katz p. 173. Subrahmanyam, p. 4.
35. K. Subrahmanyam, India's Security. p. i. Dennis Austin and Anirudha Gupta, The Politics of Violence in India and South Asia. pp. 9-15. Armitage, p. 11.
36. Austin and Gupta, p. 15. Subrahmanyam, pp. 13-17. Corcoran, Trip Report -- Conference: "Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in South Asia", p. 3.
37. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, GEN., Statement of the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, on International Security Environment (Strategy) before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, pp. 698, 716.
38. Haass, p. 186. Barry M. Blechman, Alternative Strategic Environments, 1994-2004, p. 32. Kemp, p. 36.
39. International Security Council, Middle East Peace Prospects, p. 4.
40. Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending, pp. 41-46. Gregory D. Foster, et al, "Global Demographic Trends to the Year 2010: Implications for U.S. Security," The Washington Quarterly, p. 21.
41. Ibrahim Ibrahim, "Forecast for the Future: State and Society in Egypt, Sudan, and Libya in 1995," in The Next Arab Decade, ed. by Hisham Sharabi, pp. 11-12.
42. Blechman, p. 31.

43. Haass, "Regional Order on the 1990s: The Challenge of the Middle East," p. 182. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan 1984: Crisis after Crisis, Internal and External," in Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives, ed. by Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle, p. 118.
44. Stephen P. Riley, African Debt and Western Interests, p. 1. David Ewing Duncan, "The Long Good-bye," The Atlantic, July 1990, p. 20-23.
45. Duncan, p. 20-23. Robert Ages, in Coates and Jarratt, pp. 80-81. Ollsegun Obasanjo, GEN., "Waking the Sleeping Giant," in Kidder, p. 173.
46. Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions," The Journal of Modern African Studies, pp. 225-227, 234, and 243.
47. Ibrahim, pp. 13-15. Schwarzkopf, p. 729.
48. Chipman, p. 164.
49. Blechman, p. 111-37. Brad Roberts, ed., The New Democracies, p. 79.
50. Richard W. Hull, "United States Policy in Southern Africa," Current History, p. 194. Robert Mandel, Conflict over the World's Resources, pp. 76, 82-83. Robert D. Wilson, Statement of the Executive Director of the National Critical Materials Council before the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, pp. 9-11. John P. Ferrier, Statement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy and Resources Policy before the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, p. 117. David S. Brown, Statement of the Acting Director of the Bureau of Mines before the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, pp. 140-156.
51. Hull, pp. 193-195. Blechman, pp. 51, 111-40. Barry M. Schutz, "Political Change and the Management of Ethnic Conflict in Zimbabwe," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. by Joseph V. Montville, p. 443. Katz, pp. 170-171.
52. Kitchen, p. 96.
53. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Rediscovering Latin America," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, p. 27. Fred F. Woerner, GEN., "The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin America," Military Review, February 1989, pp. 19-20.

54. Georges A. Fauriol, "The Shadow of Latin American Affairs," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1989/90, pp. 118.

55. Jack Child, ed., Regional Cooperation for Development and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Latin America, pp. 107-114. Pope G. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, pp. 54, 316-317. CIA, The World Factbook, p. 340.

56. Future Security Environment Working Group, pp. 55-56. Schwartz, p. 257.

57. Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, The Security of the Caribbean, pp. 24-30.

58. Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, The Security of the Caribbean, pp. 24-30. Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Cuba's Cloudy Future," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1990, pp. 113-114, 119, and 125.

59. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, p. 16. Kitchen, p. 94.

60. Kitchen, p. 92.

61. Schwartz, p. 257.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Armitage, Richard L. "U.S. Security in the Pacific in the 21st Century." Strategic Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 9-18.
- Association of the United States Army. 1989: End of a Decade -- End of an Era: a Global Assessment. Arlington, VA: AUSA, 1990.
- Atkins, G. Pope. Latin America in the International Political System. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- Austin, Dennis, and Gupta, Anirudha. The Politics of Violence in India and South Asia. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990.
- Baker, James. Foreign Policy Priorities and US Assistance. Current Policy No. 1274. Washington: U.S. Department of State, May 1990.
- Barnaby, Frank, ed. Future War: Armed Conflict in the Next Decade. London: Michael Joseph, 1984.
- Blechman, Barry M. Alternative Strategic Environments, 1994-2004. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1985.
- Bracken, Paul J. Strategic Planning for National Security: Lessons from Business Experience. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Strategy Assessment Center, 1990.
- Bratersky, M.V., and Lunyou, S.I. "India at the End of the Century." Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 927-942.
- Brecher, Michael. Crisis, Conflict, and Instability. New York: Pergamon Press, 1989.
- Brown, David S. Statement of the Acting Director of the Bureau of Mines to the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Washington: U.S. Bureau of Mines, 10 December 1987.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Post-Communist Nationalism." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5, Winter 1989/90, pp. 1-25.
- Bush, George. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: The White House, March 1990.
- Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1990. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990.

Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. The Security of the Caribbean. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1989.

Child, Jack, ed. Regional Cooperation for Development and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Latin America. New York: International Peace Academy, 1987.

Chipman, John. "Third World Politics and Security in the 1990s: 'The World Forgetting, by the World Forgot'?" The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 151-168.

Clancey, Tom. Clear and Present Danger. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1989.

Coates, Joseph F., and Jarratt, Jennifer. What Futurists Believe. Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1989.

Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Discriminate Deterrence. Washington: The Commission, 11 January 1988.

Corcoran, James R., COL. Asia-Pacific: Challenges to Formulation of U.S. National Security Strategy for "The Century of Asia". Study Paper. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College. (Cited with special permission.)

Corcoran, James R., COL. Asia-Pacific Regional Strategic Appraisal. Lectures. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 17 January - 25 February 1991. (Cited with special permission.)

Corcoran, James R., COL. Trip Report--Conference: "Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in South Asia". Villanova University, 26 November 1990. (Cited with special permission.)

Crowe, William J., Jr., Admiral. Statement of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on International Security Environment (Strategy) before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 14 April 1989.

Day, Arthur R., and Doyle, Michael W., eds. Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.

Didsbury, Howard F., Jr., ed. Challenges and Opportunities from Now to 2001. Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1986.

Duncan, David Ewing. "The Long Good-bye." The Atlantic, Vol. 266, No. 1, July 1990, pp. 20-24.

Dunn, Keith A. In Defense of NATO. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

"Economic and Demographic Trends and International Security: A U.S. Analysis." Population and Development Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 1989, pp. 587-599.

Etzold, Thomas H. "The Strategic Environment of the Twenty-first Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planners." Strategic Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 23-31.

Fauriol, Georges A. "The Shadow of Latin American Affairs." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1, America and the World 1989/90, pp. 116-134.

Ferrier, John P. Statement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy and Resources Policy to the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Washington: U.S. Department of State, 10 December 1987.

Foster, Gregory D., et al. "Global Demographic Trends to the Year 2010: Implications for U.S. Security." The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 5-24.

434th Military Intelligence Detachment. New Political-Military Realities in East Asia: An Assessment of U.S. Interests, Threats, and Commitments. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990.

Future Security Environment Working Group. The Future Security Environment. Report submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long - Term Security. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, October 1988.

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History? Washington: National Affairs, Inc., 1989.

Future Security Environment Working Group. Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment. Report submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long - Term Security. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1988.

Gaddis, John L. "Coping with Victory." The Atlantic, Vol. 265, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 49-60.

Gray, Colin S. War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

Gunter, Michael. "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, Summer 1990, pp. 57-81.

- Gutteridge, William F. South Africa: Apartheid's Endgame. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990.
- Gutteridge, William F. The Case for Regional Security - Avoiding Conflict in the 1990s. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1989.
- Haass, Richard. Conflicts Unending. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Haass, Richard N. "Regional Order on the 1990s: The Challenge of the Middle East." The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 181-188.
- Hamilton, Edward K., ed. America's Global Interests: A New Agenda. New York: Norton, 1989.
- Heisbourg, Francois. The Changing Strategic Landscape. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1989.
- Hill, John. "Philippine Communists: Poised for a Comeback?" Armed Forces Journal International, Vol 128, No. 6, January 1991, pp. 27-30.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. "A New World and its Troubles." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, Fall 1990, pp. 115-122.
- Hollins, Harry B; Powers, Averill; and Sommers, Mack. The Conquest of War: Alternative Strategies for Global Security. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989
- Hull, Richard W. "United States Policy in Southern Africa." Current History, Vol. 89, No. 547, May 1990, pp. 193-196.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "Coping with the Lippman Gap." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3, 1987/88, pp. 453-477.
- Hyland, William G. "America's New Course." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 1-12.
- Inaugural Workshop. Security and Stability in the Third World. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1989.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 1989-1990. London: Brassey's, 1990.
- International Security Council. Middle East: A Political-Strategic Assessment. New York: The Council, 1988.
- International Security Council. Middle East Peace Prospects. New York: The Council, 1989.

- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. Test Pub. Washington: January 1990.
- Joy, Ernest H., II, CAPT. "Impending Base Closures in the Philippines Require a New U.S. Basing Strategy in the Pacific." Strategic Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 29-34.
- Katz, Mark N. Beyond the Reagan Doctrine: "Reassessing U.S. Policy Toward Regional Conflicts." The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 169-179.
- Kemp, Geoffrey. "Middle East Opportunities." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, 1988/1989, pp. 141-158.
- Kemp, Geoffrey. "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War." The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4, Autumn 1990, pp. 33-51.
- Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Kidder, Rushworth M. An Agenda for the 21st Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
- Kimmitt, Robert M. US Policy on Regional Conflicts: Cambodia and Afghanistan. Current Policy No. 1281. Washington: U.S. Department of State, June 1990.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Beyond the Cold War." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1, America and the World 1989/90, pp. 1-16.
- Kitchen, Helen. Some Guidelines on Africa for the Next President. Washinton: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988.
- Kotkin, Joel. The Third Century: America's Resurgence in the Asian Era. New York: Crown, 1988.
- Krueger, Paul K. Statement of the Assistant Associate Director for Mobilization Preparedness of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Washington: U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 10 December 1987.
- Laffin, John. The World in Conflict: War Annual 2, A Guide to Contemporary Wars and Conflicts. Washington: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1987.

- Lamb, Ivan F, LTC. The Nineties and Beyond. Military Study Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 12 February 1990.
- Laqueur, Walter. Soviet Union 2000. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- Lefever, Ernest W., and Van der Lugt, Robert D., eds. Perestroika. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1989.
- Leifer, Michael. Cambodian Conflict - The Final Phase? London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1989.
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. "Rediscovering Latin America." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, Fall 1990, pp. 27-41.
- Mandel, Robert. Conflict over the World's Resources. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.
- McGeorge, Harvey J. "Bugs, Gas, and Missiles." Defense and Foreign Affairs, Nos 5-6, May-June 1990, pp. 18-20.
- McGuire, Martin C. "The Revolution in International Security." Challenge, Vol. 33, No. 2, March/ April 1990, pp. 4-10.
- McNamara, Robert S. Out of the Cold: New Thinking for American Foreign and Defense Policy in the 21st Century. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War." The Atlantic, Vol. 266, No. 2, August 1990, pp. 35-50.
- Montville, Joseph V., ed. Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.
- Nabie, Isata, and Prendergast, John. "A Land Divided." Africa Report, Vol. 35, No. 4, September/October 1990, pp. 58-61.
- Naisbitt, John and Aburdene, Patricia. Megatrends 2000. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1990.
- Nolan, Janne, and Wheelon, Albert D. "Third World Ballistic Missiles." Scientific American, Vol. 263, No. 2, August 1990, pp. 34,39.

- North, Robert Carver. War, Peace, Survival. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1990.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "The Misleading Metaphor of Decline." The Atlantic, Vol. 265, No. 3, March 1990, pp. 86-94.
- Offense - Defense Working Group. The Future of Containment. Report submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long - Term Security. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1988.
- Purcell, Susan Kaufman. "Cuba's Cloudy Future." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 113-130.
- Regional Conflict Working Group. Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict. Report submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long - Term Security. Washington: U. S. Department of Defense, 1988.
- Remnek, Richard B. "The Strategic Importance of the Bab el-Mandeb and the Horn of Africa." Naval War College Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1990, pp. 6-30.
- Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. The Aegean and Cyprus. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990.
- Riley, Stephen P. African Debt and Western Interests. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1989.
- Roberts, Brad, ed. The New Democracies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990.
- Ronfeldt, David F. Three Dark Pieces. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1990.
- Rothmann, Harry E, COL. The U. S. Army Strategic Formulation and Force Planning: Past, Present, Future. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1990.
- Scalapino, Robert A. "Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1, America and the World 1989/90, pp. 89-115.
- Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, GEN. Statement of the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, on International Security Environment (Strategy) before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Washington: U. S. Department of Defense, 20 April 1989.

- Sharabi, Hisham, ed. The Next Arab Decade. London: Mansell Publishers, 1988.
- Sherwood, Elizabeth D. Allies in Crisis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Silverstein, Josef. "Civil War and Rebellion in Burma." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 114-134.
- Smith, Perry M., MG(Ret). "Developing a Long - Term National Strategy." Airpower Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1989, pp. 4-14.
- Snow, Donald M. The Shape of the Future: The Post-1989 World. M.C. Sharpe, 1991 pending. (Cited with special permission.)
- Subrahmanyam, K. India's Security. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988.
- Taylor, Charles W. Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990.
- Treverton, Gregory F., ed. Europe and America beyond 2000. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990.
- Van der Kroef, Justus Maria. Aquino's Philippines. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988.
- Viahos, Michael. Thinking about World Change. Washington: U. S. Department of State, 1990.
- Wall, Patrick. "Scenario for the Future." Sea Power, Vol. 33, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 33-38.
- Wallace, J. Richard, LTC. The Gideon Doctrine: An Army Strategic Vision for a World in Chaos. Military Study Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 12 February 1990.
- Wilson, Robert D. Statement of the Executive Director of the National Critical Materials Council to the Mining and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Washington: U.S. National Critical Materials Council, 10 December 1987.
- Woerner, Fred F., GEN. "The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin America." Military Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, February 1989, pp. 18-28.

Woodward, Peter. War or Peace in North-east Africa? London:
Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1989.

Zoubir, Yahia H. "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and
International Dimensions." The Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1990, pp. 225-243.